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Structuring Institutions to Share Local Weather Risk Globally  
Jianqiang Hao and Jerry Skees 
 
Abstract 
This paper envisions the national weather index as an efficient instrument to hedge the 
agricultural risk. The theoretical framework is established based on the partition of risk and the 
cost minimization. The Morocco case was applied and the result shows that the risk can be 
reduced to a larger extent. 
Key works: risk, weather index, reinsurance. 
 
This article is motivated by the prospects for a more efficient global market for weather 
risk.  Rainfall index insurance contracts are used as the empirical case to illustrate some basic 
concepts.  These risks are first targeted at the local level with province contracts and then 
aggregated to the national level as a portfolio of regional contracts.  A national rainfall index is 
developed to hedge (or reinsure) the basket of regional indexes.  Despite relatively strong 
correlation among the regions, this aggregation performs as it should for insurance purposes by 
shifting risk among regions and reducing the total risk level of the pool below the pre-aggregated 
sum of individual risks.  Harrington and Niehaus demonstrate the potential hedging effectiveness 
of insurance derivatives using the regional estimates of catastrophe losses and the multi-state 
contracts.  This paper applies a similar framework to a bundle of agricultural risk in Morocco.  
What is important about this contribution is that it provides both an empirical case study and 
suggested institutional arrangements for what is possible in structuring regional, national, and 
global risk sharing markets.      2 
Four parts are included in this article. First, the conceptual problem is developed along 
with a review of the literature. Second, the theoretical framework for a national weather index 
and the basic institutional model for applying the national index are developed.  Third, the 
empirical analysis is provided using data from rainfall and crop yields in Morocco. Fourth, 
conclusions and recommendations are developed.  
Background and Literature Review 
Global climate change poses significant challenges to our society, especially for farmers 
and those whose livelihoods are often determined by the climate. Extreme events can have a 
devastating impact on a wide population. Weather Futures & Options Resource Center estimates 
that nearly twenty percent of the U.S. economy is directly affected by weather, especially 
agriculture, energy, retailing, travel, leisure and entertainment (CME). It is reasonable to believe 
that this percentage is even larger for many developing countries since the economies of these 
countries rely heavily on the agriculture, which highly sensitive to weather conditions.  
In the United States and some other developed countries, such as Europe and Canada, the 
federally subsidized insurance programs, for example the disaster aid program, crop insurance 
program, and the private catastrophe insurance also provide protection against many weather-
related risks. However, these programs are plagued with moral hazard, adverse selection, 
correlated risks and reinsurance problems (Skees and Reed; Smith and Goodwin; Miranda and 
Glauber; Skees and Barnett; Skees). Risk sharing markets in developing countries are largely 
considered as incomplete markets.  
Weather markets emerged in the U.S. in 1997 to hedge against weather events that 
created fluctuations in revenues for energy providers.  These markets have expanded to Japan 
and Europe, from energy markets to agricultural markets.  In recent years, actual trading of   3 
weather has slowed.  However, the concept of writing insurance-like contracts on weather events 
has been adopted by most of the major reinsurers of the world.  The World Bank has been 
involved in providing significant technical assistance to introduce the index contracts like rainfall 
insurance contracts in several developing countries (e.g., Morocco, Mexico, Tunisia, Ethiopia, 
Argentina, Turkey, Romania, Ukraine, and Mongolia [Skees, Varangis, Larson, and Siegel]) . 
Prior research has analyzed weather risk and provided the evidences about the potential 
of weather markets in sharing agricultural risk. Rosenzweig and Binswanger utilize panel data 
from rural India investments, wealth and rainfall to measure the riskiness of farmers’ investment 
portfolios in terms of their sensitivity to weather variation. Their results supported the hypothesis 
that the asset portfolios are influenced significantly by the degree of rainfall variability. In 
particular, farmers in riskier environments select portfolios that are less sensitive to rainfall 
variation and less profitable. Chichilnisky and Heal address four key issues regarding weather-
related risks: 1) difficulty in assessing risks; 2) endogenity of risks, 3) correlation of risks, and 4) 
irreversibility.  They propose that it would be better to allow agents to trade securities contingent 
on such collective risks, and cover the individual components of risks by mutual insurance 
contracts.  
Weather risks are spatially correlated at levels that are less than 100%, thus Skees and 
Barnett refer to these risks as “in-between” risk. They provide a conceptual base for 
understanding why markets for sharing catastrophic risks may be incomplete and suggest 
auctioning government options on indexes that would facilitate reinsurance for low-frequency, 
high-consequence events as a more efficient means. Martin, Barnett and Coble develop a unique 
precipitation derivative to allow the purchaser to specify the parameters of the indemnity   4 
function and use a cotton harvest example from Mississippi to present the pricing method. Their 
results show a potential for weather derivatives to serve niche market within U.S. agriculture. 
Skees, Hazell and Miranda introduce negotiable state-contingent contracts settled on area 
or locally appropriate weather indices, such as regional rainfall insurance contracts, as a good 
instrument to share the risks. The essential principle of area-based index insurance is that 
contracts are written against specific perils or events defined and recorded at a regional level. 
Turvey uses the daily rainfall and temperature data from Ontario, Canada to analyze the 
relationship of rainfall to the specific event risks that cause economic damage and then designs 
weather derivatives to hedge these risk. His results suggest that weather derivatives have the 
properties similar to conventional options and single payoff and multiple event contracts can be 
written. 
The advantage of weather index is obvious: the indemnity depends on the specified 
weather variable rather than actual losses such as crop failure, thus, moral  hazard and adverse 
selection has been eliminated and the transaction costs have been reduced significantly (Skees, 
Hazell, and Miranda). In a true market for weather investors outside of agriculture would have a 
chance to purchase or write the weather index contract. However, the correlated risk across 
different regions poses a significant pressure for the insurance and reinsurance company to 
maintain adequate reserves to cover high losses associated with a low probability of occurrence. 
Turvey, Nayak and Sparling in 1999 showed that the significance or benefits of reinsurance may 
not rely on indemnities only but rather on liquidity of capital held in reserve funds. Thus, an 
efficient weather market requires a convergence of insurance and capital markets (Jeffee and 
Russell). Unfortunately, such a prerequisite is unlikely for most developing countries. 
Meanwhile, international insurance and reinsurance markets are unlikely to offer affordable   5 
insurance for risks that are correlated.  The global reinsurance markets are quite cyclical even in 
developed economies. For example, hurricane insurance was withdrawn by insures after the 
devastating losses associated with hurricane Andrew in 1992 (Miranda and Glauber). Earthquake 
insurance coverage availability declined immediately after Northridge earthquake (GAO). And 
there has been a significant tightening of the reinsurance market in response to the devastation 
created by the terrorist attacks of 9-11.  
An ideal market for reinsurance would have a highly elastic supply curve where price of 
reinsurance would be insensitive to the actual losses. However, the imperfections in capital 
markets imply that the marginal cost of providing reinsurance is increasing and the supply curve 
of reinsurance is upward sloped. The leftward shift in the supply curve (Figure 1) as a result of 
reinsurer losses leads to the increase in the price of reinsurance. On the other hand, the 
catastrophe losses may lead to increases in the demand because of the perceived risk. Rightward 
shift in the demand curve (Figure 1) also can lead to an increase in the reinsurance price. Thus, 
the new equilibrium in the reinsurance markets after a catastrophe loss is generally a higher price 
and a lower quantity supplied. Froot and Connell reported that prices on catastrophe-reinsurance 
more than doubled during 1992-1994 and then began to decline thereafter. Furthermore, they 
suggest that most of price and quantity shocks stem from shifts in the supply of capital in the 





Theoretically, in the Arrow-Debreu framework, an exogenous “states of nature” exists 
whose values are random and represent sources of uncertainty. Agents in the economy are 
allowed to trade “state-contingent commodities.” Under a complete set of markets for state-
contingent commodities, the first theorem of welfare economics holds for economics under 
uncertainty, that is, Pareto Optimality can be obtained by a competitive economy with 
uncertainty about exogenous variables (Arrow). 
In the absence of Arrow-Debreu world, there are two primary mechanisms for managing 
risk: trading of market-based securities and the use of insurance. The securities model needs the 
public information and counter-party willing to take the opposite position in the specific risk 
being hedged. For example, in many commodities futures market (e.g. corn) the hedgers can take 
different positions in futures contracts to diversify the risk of price change. 
The use of insurance markets for pooling risks requires a large population and 
statistically independent risks. The law of large numbers holds and then the frequency of 
occurrence of an insured event would be asymptotically distributed as its incidence in the whole 
population (Chichilnisky and Heal; Skees and Barnett). Asymmetric information between the 
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Figure 1. The Effect of Catastrophe Shock on the Reinsurance Market 
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insured and the outside creates the dual problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Priest 
argues that there are three principal features that determine the extent to which insurance can 
effectively share the risk level: the aggregation of risks, the segregation of risks into separate risk 
pools, and the control of moral hazard and adverse selection through deductibles, coinsurance, 
and exclusions of coverage.  
Furthermore, Chichilnisky and Heal state that Arrow-Debreu approach to risk reduction 
through state-contingent markets is universally applicable but cumbersome, sometimes 
extremely complicated and perhaps unrealistic in the case of risks with individual components 
while insurance markets are more manageable but leave uncovered collective or correlated risks. 
According to Lewis and Murdock’s analysis, the securities model of managing risk is most 
appropriate when the critical information is public and a market for the trading of the risk exists. 
The insurance model, on the other hand, is more appropriate for providing protection against a 
large and independent risk of an individual. Under these conditions, the insurance providers 
diversify the risk by creating a large portfolio of these independent and identically distributed 
risks so that the variance of mean risk in the portfolio is significantly lower than the variance of 
the individual risk. 
Concurrently, there are two approaches to pricing the risk. One is the actuarial approach 
(“Burn Rate”) to pricing. This method begins by identifying the weather events that have a 
significant impact on the revenue stream and developing contracts that effectively shift this risk. 
Insurance companies are the main source of protection against such weather events. These 
companies must load the pricing to pay for reinsurance and the reinsurers load their pricing to 
develop reserves and to cover ambiguity in understanding the catastrophe risk. The burn-rate   8 
approach draws from the statistical inference over time, which assumes that history will repeat 
itself with the same likelihood as the past events described by the data used.  
If the weather risk can be efficiently traded, the second pricing method is arbitrage 
pricing. The market-maker creates a market by allowing parties with opposite positions to trade 
or swap their risks. Here prices are set by the willingness of counterparties to pay to take a given 
risk position. Arbitrage plays a role as speculators take advantage on differences between options 
prices and the price of the underlying tradable commodity using a pricing method such as Black-
Scholes. 
Unfortunately, weather derivatives do not fall completely in either category of these two 
pricing methods. On the one hand, weather risks are not independent and identically distributed 
but are geographically correlated; on the other hand, information on the properties of weather 
risk is not generally publicly available and is asymmetrically distributed in favor of the insured 
(Lewis and Murdock). Currently, there is agreement in the literature that pricing of weather 
derivatives, at this time, more clearly follows the actuarial approach (Lewis and Murdock, Skees 
and Barnett). According to the Swiss Reinsurance Company, in 2000, risk-linked securities 
represented less than 0.5 percent of the worldwide catastrophe insurance (GAO). However, as 
the market develops and counterparty risks are more fully recognized, liquidity and volume 
could increase making pricing of weather derivatives look more like arbitrage pricing, or at least 
to add some aspects of arbitrage pricing so that end prices are lower than a pure actuarial 
approach.  
Skees, Hazell and Miranda address a system of insurance that needs the following 
requirements: 1) It is affordable and accessible to all kinds of people, especially for the rural 
people and the poor; 2) It compensates for catastrophic income losses to protect consumption and   9 
debt repayment capacity; 3) It is practical to implement given the limited kinds of data available; 
4) It can be provided by the private sector with little or no government subsidies; 5) It avoids the 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems to the least extent.  
However, the insurance of weather risk is not same as that of the traditional risk, such as 
automobile, fire, and so on. For most of insurance, the loss ratio is reasonably smooth since the 
value of loss varies little from year to year. In contrary, the annual losses of weather risk are 
highly variable. Statistically, the loss might be far from its mean in some bad years so that a large 
amount of capital is required to cover the huge losses. The variability of different loss is shown 
in the table 1. The results show that the loss variability (CV) of the Multiple Peril Crop is about 
as 8 times as that of Private Auto Liability. Thus, some researches recommend loading the 
premium for the weather risk to cover the varied losses (Borch; Jaffee and Russel; Skees and 
Barnett). 
Table 1. Loss Raito and Variability of Different Risks Between 1991 to 1994 
Name  1991 (%)  1992 (%)  1993 (%)  1994 (%)  Variability 
(CV) 
Fire  56.6  77.0  53.0  55.7  18.3 
Commercial Auto Liability  69.2  66.4  65.0  66.1  2.7 
Private Auto Liability  77.2  73.5  73.4  71.7  3.1 
Burglary and theft  23.9  17.1  19.1  21.2  14.3 
Multiple Peril Crop  124.2  125.0  167.6  89.5  25.3 
Earthquake  12.9  9.7  2.9  852.2  192.2 
Source: the loss ratio is from A. M. Best, the CV is calculated by authors. 
 
Therefore, Skees and Barnett propose five basic equations under the actuarial approach. 
The equations are the guide for us to establish the national rainfall index. 
(1)  Loss cost = indemnities / protection outstanding 
(2)  Additional cost = reserve load + cat. Load + administer. Costs + return on equity   10 
(3)  Premium rate = expected loss cost + (additional cost / protection outstanding) 
(4)  Premium = premium rate * protection outstanding 







Theoretical Framework and Basic Model 
Theoretical Framework 
  The basic model is examined following the work of Mahul except using the national 
index as the hedging tool. Since the weather-related risk is partially correlated across the 
insureds, the aggregate loss L of a national pool can be partitioned into a systemic component s 
and an idiosyncratic component e. Assume these two components are independent. The loss 
function can be written as 
(1)  L = L (s, e) 
  The insurers can provide two layers of policies in hedging these two components. The 
first layer is designed to insure the idiosyncratic risk on the realization of the systemic loss, 
Mahul called it the fully participating policy. It can be described by the set (I(.),P(.)). I is the 
indemnity function based on the national index. 
(2)  I = I (?) where ? is the designed national index. 
  The idiosyncratic risk is assumed to be independent with zero transaction cost and a large 
risk pool. Then, the law of large numbers holds and the premium is thus equal to the expected 
indemnity. 
(3)  P = E I (?) 
  The second layer (J(.), Q(.)) is designed to hedge the non-diversifiable risk, which is 
called the non-participating policy by Mahul. The national index is not fully correlated with the   11 
weather variable in the individual regions. For example, we can assume b R a a + + = 1 0 q , where 
R is the regional weather index and b represents the basis risk. The indemnity function based on 
the loss due to the basis risk can be written as: 
(4)  J = J (?, R) 
  Assume insurers are risk averse and the safety loading is a function of the indemnity. The 
premium Q can be written as 
(5)  Q = EJ (?, R) + C(J), where C is the loading cost. 
  For the low frequency but high consequence risk, a convenient rule for making the safety 
loading is proportional to the standard deviation of the expected loss (Borch). 
The decision rule for determining the optimal contract is not unique. The framework of 
utility maximization might be the traditional method. However, an insurance company that holds 
the weather index with the catastrophic loss might have priority to reduce the probability of ruin 
that may jeopardize the position of the company. Thus, we choose the minimization of the cost 
as the objective for the insurers. It can be expressed as 
(6)       ) ( Q P Min
w +  
  Subject to conditions of (2)-(5) 
Basic Model 
Consider a country where there are n provinces (regions). Let Rit be rainfall for the 
individual province i during the time t. The country index is introduced as  
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  A number of researches have made contribution to the form of indemnity function for the 
weather market (Skees and Zeuli; Turvey; Martin, Barnett and Coble). We follow the European 
precipitation options proposed by Skees and Zeuli and developed by Martin, Barnett and Coble, 
but it is in the form of puts since our emphasis is the rain deficiency rather than excessive rain: 
                           0                             if x>strike 





          if strike ‡ x > limit,    · liability, 
                           1                             if  x < limit 
  
Where strike, limit and liability are three choice variables to define the indemnity function and 
the pure premium rate is the average of the percentage shortfalls below the strike. The indemnity 
function is pictorially sketched in the figure 2. 
Based on the indemnity function, the regional rainfall index is defined as 
(9)          ) 0 , ) (( ) , ( i it i i it Tick R Strike Max Strike R I · - =  










  Indemnity varies over years and the underwriter would like to load the pricing to cover a 
set amount of average loss over time. A proportion of the standard deviation is chosen to reflect 
the likelihood of having a catastrophic year. Here we define the pure premium (PP) and the 
loaded premium (LP) for the regional index as: 
(10)  ) , ( ( i it i i strike R I E Mean PP = =    13 
  i i i SD load Mean LP · + = . 
Where Meani = E(I(Rit, Strikei)), SDi =  )) ( ( , i it Strike R I Var . 
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Figure 2: Indemnity Payment for the Rainfall Index 
 
The distribution of rainfall can be estimated by using either nonparametric methods (e.g. 
kernel smoothing, empirical distribution) or parametric methods. Nonparametric density 
estimation techniques do not assume a particular functional form for the rainfall distribution but 
allow the observed data to select the most appropriate form of the rainfall distributions. The 
simplest nonparametric method available for making the inference is to use the empirical rate. 
Parametric techniques fit the observed data to one of the standard distribution (e.g. normal 
distribution, gamma distribution etc) by some statistical methods (e.g. by the maximum 
likelihood method). Martin, Barnett and Coble have suggested a gamma distribution to 
characterize the distribution of climatological variables (such as cumulative rainfall) because it is 
non-negative, skewness and sufficiently flexible to adequately characterize cumulative 
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Assume we known the probability density function of Rit is f(R), we can redefine the pure 
premium rate (PPR) as  
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  Under the framework of risk partition and cost minimization for the national index, we 
can provide the first layer (I(.), P(.)) for the national index as 
(12)  ) 0 , ) (( ) , ( Tick Strike Max Strike I t t · - = q q  











, for country index. 
(13)  )) , ( ( ) , ( strike I E strike P t q q =  
  where  ) (q f is the probability density function of the national rainfall index. 
  The second layer (J(.), Q(.)) for the national index is designed as  
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) , ( , reflecting the total indemnity for period t using the regional index. 
(15)  Q =  )) , ( ( )) , ( ( q q R J SD R J E +  
Optimally national rainfall index should be designed to minimize the cost under the two 
layers of contract, that is, 
(16)   
strike Min P + Q =  )) , ( ( )) , ( ( )) , ( ( q q q R J SD R J E strike I E t + +  
  Subject to the conditions of (12)-(15) 
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, strike is set at the optimal level.   15 
The reduction in the cost can be attributed to two factors: first, systematic risks have been 
reduced to some extent because of pooling the regional risk to the national level; second, because 
of the potential for lowering the national loading via the loading rules.  
 
Data and Empirical Results 
  The following empirical analysis focuses on Morocco’s three primary cereal crops in 
seventeen provinces:  hard wheat, soft wheat, and barley, maize is added in some parts.  These 
crops are planted in the fall and subject to basically the same weather events. In Morocco, 
agriculture represents nearly 20% of the GDP but suffers from cyclical droughts of variable 
amplitudes. Kumado has showed that the country’s GDP is highly related to agricultural 
production, which is in turn highly correlated to rainfall. The primary source of information used 
in this analysis is data supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture in Morocco.  These data include 
the rainfall information, the annual production and plantings from the 1978-79 campaign to the 
1998-99 campaign for 17 provinces which exist in the zones of B.FAVORABLE, D.SUD and 
INTERMED.  Since maize data were also supplied, maize is added to some of the analysis.   
  Following the work of Skees, Gober, Varangis, Lester and Kalavakonda, an average of 
the previous three years of plantings is used to estimate the current crop revenue by location. 
Current prices for each commodity are also used in all provinces: 190 MAD/quintal for maize; 
190 MAD/quintal for barley; 250 MAD/quintal for soft wheat; and 280 MAD/quintal for hard 
wheat. The series of adjusted yields is then used to develop a matrix of revenues for the specific 
events in today’s term: 
(18)         Revenuetpc = Adjusted yieldtpc × Hectarestpc × Pricec 
Where t = year, 1979-1999; p = province; and c = crop   16 
  Yields are adjusted for the heteroscedasticity, that is, the variances in the yields around 
trend are increasing through time. 
(19)        Adjusted Yieldt = (Actual yieldt / Trend yieldt)·Forecasted 1999 Yield 
  The national rainfall index was set up based on the rainfall weighted on the each 
province’s revenue. The summary statistics for rainfall in each province and the national index 
are presented in table 2. The national index appears to have a small variance comparing with the 
rainfall in most of individual provinces.  
Table 2 Summary Statistics of Rainfall and National Rainfall Index from 1979-1999 
 
Variable  N  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
AGADIR  21  234.19524  128.87361  69  602 
BEN_SLIMANE  21  344.94635  133.09045  127.18333  633.7 
CASABLANCA  21  306.47143  135.56426  110  612.8 
EL_JADIDA  21  334.97619  133.71756  112.8  676.5 
EL_KELAA  21  255.33333  114.52345  105.73333  576.03333 
ESSAOUIRA  21  268.19762  139.7987  94  597.4 
FES  21  270.51429  106.77171  94.8  466 
KENITRA  21  404.27143  179.48568  117.2  822.4 
KHEMISSET  21  344.94635  133.09045  127.18333  633.7 
KHOURIBGA  21  290.2381  112.41536  103.4  564.2 
MARRAKECH  21  170.17143  68.95513  76.7  314 
MEKNES  21  329.72857  110.558  102.2  553 
RABAT  21  361.04762  155.82895  121  763.6 
SAFI  21  314.21429  161.06353  133  804.7 
SETTAT  21  315.77222  126.41831  120.06667  629.36667 
TAOUNATE  21  344.94635  133.09045  127.18333  633.7 
TAZA  21  365.40952  154.88978  100.4  639.9 
National Index  21  311.19499  119.24126  123.85938  624.94222 
 
  CV is a good measure of relative risk as long as the risks are normally distributed. Skees, 
Gober, Varangis, Lester and Kalavakonda test the assumption of normality and fail to reject for 
the Moroccan revenue data. Pearson correlations are used to evaluate the relationship between 
rainfall and revenue among provinces. The estimate s of relative risk (CV) for revenue and 
Pearson correlation between rainfall and revenue during two periods: 1979-1999 and 1990-1999 
are presented as the table 3. The results show that there are rather great differences in the relative   17 
risk across Morocco; the average of CV for revenue across the seventeen provinces is 48% 
during this period. Correlation for these three zones average 69 percent over the full 21-year 
period. They increase to an average of 77 percent over the last decade. The change indicates a 
higher exposure to rainfall risk. Skees, et al attributed it to increased cultivation of marginal 
areas that are more susceptible to weather risks and because of the downward trend in average 
rainfall. 
  Pearson correlations are also used to check the spatial correlation risk among the 
provinces. The full matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients is listed in table 4. Probability 
values associated with tests that the Pearson correlations are zero are computed by treating 








 as coming from a student t distribution with n-2 degrees of freedom, where r is the 
appropriate correlation. As expected, the results show that the correlated risk of rainfall among 
the province is significant, suggesting that the use of national rainfall index might be applicable 
for the Morocco’s case.  
  The indemnity function for the regional index is constructed based on our model. First, 
we set the limit as 50 since it is a relatively low number. Next, we choose the burn rates (pure 
premium rates) as 5%, 7.5% and 10% respectively for all 17 states, then the corresponding 
strikes for each province can be determined based on the (11). The loading factor is chosen as 
33% of the standard deviation of the indemnity to cover the likelihood of a real blow out.  
Finally, we establish the national rainfall index as the weighted index and provide two 
policies (fair and loading) for different risks. The contract is optimized so that the total cost is 
minimized. The optimal strike and premium rate for the country index can be solved 
numerically. The empirical results under the 5% burn rate, 7.5% burn rate and 10% burn rate are 
provided in table 5-7.   18 
Under the 5% burn rate, the optimal strike was set to be 180 to minimize the cost for the 
national index. The pure premium rate drops to 3.86% from 5% and the total premium rate drops 
by 39.7% from 9.58% to 5.78%.  
Under the 7.5% burn rate for the regional index, the strike was set to be 203 to minimize 
the cost. The pure premium rate drops to about 5.96% from 7.5% and the loaded premium rate 
drop by 35% from 13.17% to 8.55%. The empirical distribution of loss ratio for the residual risk 
and the total risk is plotted as the follow. The efficacy of the national index in hedging the risk is 
shown by the difference of these two empirical CDF. 


























Under the 10% burn rate, the pure premium rate drop from 10% to 7.94% and the loaded 
premium rate drop by 31.1% from 16.56% to 11.41%. 
The about one-third reduction in the premium rate for each of these three cases 
demonstrates the efficacy of the national index in hedging the risk. 
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Conclusion 
  Weather market is emerging as an innovative mechanism to share the climate risks and it 
has wide applications in both nonagricultural industries and agricultural production. However, 
the traditional weather index might be difficult in application to the developing country because 
of the correlated risk across different regions and imperfect capital market imperfections. 
  In this article, we propose the national rainfall index under the actuarial approach as a 
more efficient instrument in hedging the weather-related risk. The efficacy of national rainfall 
index lies on its spread on the correlation risk, reduce the loaded premium rate and increase the 
potential interest of international re-insures and capital markets in investing in this program. 
Empirically, the over one-third reduction in the loaded premium in the Morocco case 
demonstrates its effectiveness and the principles of layering the risk and organizing the 
institutions to do so. Since rainfall index can be undermined by El nino Southern Oscillations for 
example and that may change the probability of the insurance events. In such case, an adjustment 
of index policies may be necessary (Skees, Hazzll and Miranda).  
Further research could consider the reinsurance market in this model and address the 
potential for reducing country basis risk by trading the national index within several countries in 
the global market, a general equilibrium model can be applied for the further analysis.  
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Table 3. Estimates of Relative Risk (CV) for Revenue and Pearson Correlation                             
Between Rainfall and Revenue 








AGADIR  D.SUD  48%  Nov-Mar  77%  Nov-Mar  89% 
BEN_SLIMANE  B.FAVORABLE  46%  Oct-Mar  77%  Oct-Mar  73% 
CASABLANCA  INTERMED  47%  Oct-Mar  60%  Oct-Mar  60% 
EL_JADIDA  INTERMED  50%  Oct-Mar  63%  Nov-Mar  64% 
EL_KELAA  D.SUD  54%  Oct-Mar  66%  Oct-Mar  72% 
ESSAOUIRA  D.SUD  54%  Nov-Mar  69%  Oct-Mar  82% 
FES  B.FAVORABLE  46%  Nov-Mar  76%  Nov-Mar  85% 
KENITRA  B.FAVORABLE  35%  Oct-Mar  59%  Oct-Mar  65% 
KHEMISSET  B.FAVORABLE  37%  Oct-Mar  77%  Oct-Mar  84% 
KHOURIBGA  D.SUD  62%  Oct-Mar  57%  Oct-Mar  90% 
MARRAKECH  D.SUD  54%  Oct-Mar  75%  Oct-Mar  78% 
MEKNES  B.FAVORABLE  37%  Nov-Mar  81%  Nov-Mar  85% 
RABAT  B.FAVORABLE  39%  Nov-Mar  48%  Nov-Mar  59% 
SAFI  D.SUD  52%  Oct-Mar  73%  Oct-Mar  71% 
SETTAT  INTERMED  70%  Oct-Mar  70%  Oct-Mar  69% 
TAOUNATE  B.FAVORABLE  44%  Nov-Mar  69%  Oct-Mar  84% 
TAZA  B.FAVORABLE  42%  Nov-Mar  62%  Nov-Mar  91% 
Average    48%    69%    71% 
Source: Skees, Gober, Varangis, Lester and Kalavakonda 
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Table 4: Pearson Correlation of Rainfall among 17 Provinces and the Test of Significance 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 
      BEN_                      
Province  AGADIR  SLIMANE  CASABLANCA  EL_JADIDA  EL_KELAA  ESSAOUIRA  FES  KENITRA  KHEMISSET 
                   
AGADIR  1  0.69598  0.79062  0.78862  0.95045  0.90985  0.56842  0.71554  0.69598 
    0.0005  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  0.0072  0.0003  0.0005 
BEN_SLIMANE  0.69598  1  0.84229  0.83809  0.7306  0.64524  0.93005  0.94849  1 
  0.0005    <.0001  <.0001  0.0002  0.0016  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
CASABLANCA  0.79062  0.84229  1  0.8954  0.84884  0.81817  0.76164  0.86244  0.84229 
  <.0001  <.0001    <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
EL_JADIDA  0.78862  0.83809  0.8954  1  0.88414  0.84347  0.70082  0.84563  0.83809 
  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001    <.0001  <.0001  0.0004  <.0001  <.0001 
EL_KELAA  0.95045  0.7306  0.84884  0.88414  1  0.96914  0.61177  0.7418  0.7306 
  <.0001  0.0002  <.0001  <.0001    <.0001  0.0032  0.0001  0.0002 
ESSAOUIRA  0.90985  0.64524  0.81817  0.84347  0.96914  1  0.50936  0.68539  0.64524 
  <.0001  0.0016  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001    0.0183  0.0006  0.0016 
FES  0.56842  0.93005  0.76164  0.70082  0.61177  0.50936  1  0.81407  0.93005 
  0.0072  <.0001  <.0001  0.0004  0.0032  0.0183    <.0001  <.0001 
KENITRA  0.71554  0.94849  0.86244  0.84563  0.7418  0.68539  0.81407  1  0.94849 
  0.0003  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  0.0001  0.0006  <.0001    <.0001 
KHEMISSET  0.69598  1  0.84229  0.83809  0.7306  0.64524  0.93005  0.94849  1 
  0.0005  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  0.0002  0.0016  <.0001  <.0001   
                   
KHOURIBGA  0.76153  0.73435  0.78362  0.89484  0.89532  0.85805  0.63661  0.70001  0.73435 
  <.0001  0.0002  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  0.0019  0.0004  0.0002 
MARRAKECH  0.77293  0.60134  0.73036  0.69057  0.82264  0.7222  0.54476  0.59521  0.60134 
  <.0001  0.0039  0.0002  0.0005  <.0001  0.0002  0.0107  0.0044  0.0039 
MEKNES  0.64243  0.94417  0.79395  0.80941  0.69659  0.59886  0.93937  0.84181  0.94417 
  0.0017  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  0.0005  0.0041  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
RABAT  0.78275  0.95389  0.86773  0.89401  0.81788  0.7558  0.8352  0.92317  0.95389 
  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
SAFI  0.92935  0.71298  0.81793  0.86177  0.97918  0.94287  0.60419  0.72839  0.71298 
  <.0001  0.0003  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  0.0037  0.0002  0.0003   24 
SETTAT  0.81318  0.8663  0.97188  0.9736  0.89445  0.85477  0.76039  0.872  0.8663 
  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
TAOUNATE  0.69598  1  0.84229  0.83809  0.7306  0.64524  0.93005  0.94849  1 
  0.0005  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  0.0002  0.0016  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
TAZA  0.52233  0.92624  0.6573  0.6602  0.53599  0.43796  0.85034  0.83522  0.92624 
  0.0151  <.0001  0.0012  0.0011  0.0123  0.0471  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
                   
National  0.85587  0.93226  0.9358  0.95578  0.91555  0.8564  0.8245  0.92228  0.93226 
  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
Province   KHOURIBGA  MARRAKECH  MEKNES  RABAT  SAFI  SETTAT  TAOUNATE  TAZA  National 
                   
AGADIR  0.76153  0.77293  0.64243  0.78275  0.92935  0.81318  0.69598  0.52233  0.85587 
  <.0001  <.0001  0.0017  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  0.0005  0.0151  <.0001 
BEN_SLIMANE  0.73435  0.60134  0.94417  0.95389  0.71298  0.8663  1  0.92624  0.93226 
  0.0002  0.0039  <.0001  <.0001  0.0003  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
CASABLANCA  0.78362  0.73036  0.79395  0.86773  0.81793  0.97188  0.84229  0.6573  0.9358 
  <.0001  0.0002  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  0.0012  <.0001 
EL_JADIDA  0.89484  0.69057  0.80941  0.89401  0.86177  0.9736  0.83809  0.6602  0.95578 
  <.0001  0.0005  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  0.0011  <.0001 
EL_KELAA  0.89532  0.82264  0.69659  0.81788  0.97918  0.89445  0.7306  0.53599  0.91555 
  <.0001  <.0001  0.0005  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  0.0002  0.0123  <.0001 
ESSAOUIRA  0.85805  0.7222  0.59886  0.7558  0.94287  0.85477  0.64524  0.43796  0.8564 
  <.0001  0.0002  0.0041  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  0.0016  0.0471  <.0001 
FES  0.63661  0.54476  0.93937  0.8352  0.60419  0.76039  0.93005  0.85034  0.8245 
  0.0019  0.0107  <.0001  <.0001  0.0037  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
KENITRA  0.70001  0.59521  0.84181  0.92317  0.72839  0.872  0.94849  0.83522  0.92228 
  0.0004  0.0044  <.0001  <.0001  0.0002  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
KHEMISSET  0.73435  0.60134  0.94417  0.95389  0.71298  0.8663  1  0.92624  0.93226 
  0.0002  0.0039  <.0001  <.0001  0.0003  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
                   
KHOURIBGA  1  0.67995  0.77427  0.79298  0.84208  0.87346  0.73435  0.54308  0.87709 
    0.0007  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  0.0002  0.011  <.0001 
MARRAKECH  0.67995  1  0.55491  0.64267  0.7812  0.73495  0.60134  0.47959  0.75323 
  0.0007    0.009  0.0017  <.0001  0.0001  0.0039  0.0278  <.0001 
MEKNES  0.77427  0.55491  1  0.86743  0.6674  0.83317  0.94417  0.84122  0.88414 
  <.0001  0.009    <.0001  0.0009  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001   25 
RABAT  0.79298  0.64267  0.86743  1  0.79909  0.90778  0.95389  0.83001  0.95357 
  <.0001  0.0017  <.0001    <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
SAFI  0.84208  0.7812  0.6674  0.79909  1  0.86547  0.71298  0.52452  0.89481 
  <.0001  <.0001  0.0009  <.0001    <.0001  0.0003  0.0146  <.0001 
SETTAT  0.87346  0.73495  0.83317  0.90778  0.86547  1  0.8663  0.67917  0.9738 
  <.0001  0.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001    <.0001  0.0007  <.0001 
TAOUNATE  0.73435  0.60134  0.94417  0.95389  0.71298  0.8663  1  0.92624  0.93226 
  0.0002  0.0039  <.0001  <.0001  0.0003  <.0001    <.0001  <.0001 
TAZA  0.54308  0.47959  0.84122  0.83001  0.52452  0.67917  0.92624  1  0.77963 
  0.011  0.0278  <.0001  <.0001  0.0146  0.0007  <.0001    <.0001 
                   
National  0.87709  0.75323  0.88414  0.95357  0.89481  0.9738  0.93226  0.77963  1 
  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001   
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Table 5        Risk Hedging Under the 5% Case 
   Strike  Tick  Loaded Prem  Pure Prem 
AGADIR  97.3  4688769  10.3%  5.00% 
BEN_SLIMANE  212.4  2327772  9.5%  5.00% 
CASABLANCA  160  1481759  9.3%  5.00% 
EL_JADIDA  188.7  7168546  9.6%  5.00% 
EL_KELAA  158.05  8486939  9.0%  5.00% 
ESSAOUIRA  142.1  2286664  10.0%  5.00% 
FES  170.9  2476632  9.9%  5.00% 
KENITRA  181.4  4685096  9.4%  5.00% 
KHEMISSET  212.4  3505251  9.5%  5.00% 
KHOURIBGA  182.2  2534956  10.0%  5.00% 
MARRAKECH  94.44  10065705  8.8%  5.00% 
MEKNES  235.2  1209456  10.4%  5.00% 
RABAT  218.7  283838  9.3%  5.00% 
SAFI  178.15  4418802  8.5%  5.00% 
SETTAT  191.9  10080210  9.8%  5.00% 
TAOUNATE  212.3  2356478  9.5%  5.00% 
TAZA  209.9  2283307  10.2%  5.00% 
Average      9.58%   
National Hedge         
First Policy  180.00  62827068    3.86% 
Second Policy       1.92%   
Total Premium Rate      5.78%   
 
Table 6        Risk Hedging Under the 7.5% Case 
   Strike  Tick  Loaded Prem  Pure Prem 
AGADIR  121.08  3120129  14.3%  7.50% 
BEN_SLIMANE  241  1979215  13.0%  7.50% 
CASABLANCA  191.7  1150272  13.4%  7.50% 
EL_JADIDA  223.6  5727404  13.4%  7.50% 
EL_KELAA  170.9  7584895  12.3%  7.50% 
ESSAOUIRA  158.3  1944615  13.3%  7.50% 
FES  194.2  2076455  13.3%  7.50% 
KENITRA  224  3538055  13.6%  7.50% 
KHEMISSET  241  2980381  13.0%  7.50% 
KHOURIBGA  215.9  2020019  13.6%  7.50% 
MARRAKECH  101.24  8729897  12.5%  7.50% 
MEKNES  263.15  1050862  13.4%  7.50% 
RABAT  244.6  246061  12.8%  7.50% 
SAFI  197.8  3831322  12.3%  7.50% 
SETTAT  222.6  8287264  13.4%  7.50% 
TAOUNATE  241  2002390  13.0%  7.50% 
TAZA  238.8  1933796  13.5%  7.50% 
Average      13.17%   
National Hedge         
First Policy  203.00  53382476  5.96%  5.96% 
Second Policy      2.6%   
Total Premium Rate       8.55%     27 
Table 7        Risk Hedging Under the 10% Case 
   Strike  Tick  Loaded Prem  Pure Prem 
AGADIR  140.7  2445191  17.8%  10.00% 
BEN_SLIMANE  267.6  1737271  16.3%  10.00% 
CASABLANCA  217.3  974259  16.8%  10.00% 
EL_JADIDA  265.4  4615958  17.1%  10.00% 
EL_KELAA  187.15  6686211  15.9%  10.00% 
ESSAOUIRA  172.85  1714300  16.5%  10.00% 
FES  209.4  1878450  16.3%  10.00% 
KENITRA  267.9  2825248  17.3%  10.00% 
KHEMISSET  267.6  2616052  16.3%  10.00% 
KHOURIBGA  236.55  1796415  16.6%  10.00% 
MARRAKECH  110.5  7393718  16.3%  10.00% 
MEKNES  284.35  955798  16.3%  10.00% 
RABAT  276.2  211686  16.3%  10.00% 
SAFI  221.05  3310549  16.0%  10.00% 
SETTAT  252.7  7056644  16.7%  10.00% 
TAOUNATE  267.6  1757612  16.3%  10.00% 
TAZA  269.6  1662572  16.8%  10.00% 
Average      16.56%   
National Hedge         
First Policy  228.00  45884937  7.94%  7.94% 
Second Policy      3.5%   
Total Premium Rate      11.41%   
 
 